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Since at least the late 1800s, lawyers in the United States have worked
for the poor without charge. These lawyers have been known by many
labels: legal aid lawyers, progressive lawyers, legal services lawyers, and
poverty lawyers. This article uses the label "poverty lawyer" to include all
lawyers, at any time, who have focused on using law, the legal system, and
other methods of advocacy, to try to change political and social institutions
in ways that ensure every person has her basic needs met for shelter, food,
clothing, and, if able, work. A poverty lawyer primarily focuses on issues
of wealth and class, distinguishing her from other lawyers working with the
poor who focus on issues such as race. A poverty lawyer today likely helps
her clients with such matters as maintaining welfare benefits, challenging
changes in food stamp regulations, lobbying her state legislature to increase
funding for free medical care for poor children, and suing a real estate
developer for failing to include the appropriate number of affordable units
in a new housing complex.
Through the years, poverty lawyers have faced a continuing challenge
- how to help the poor change their conditions. Poverty lawyers have had
to consider what tactics will work: litigation, legislative lobbying, social
protest, or some other method. They have also faced a continuing dilemma
- whether to focus on the individual client and solve the specific problem
she has, or focus on changing the political and social structures that create
and enforce poverty. Further, poverty lawyers have to consider the
interplay between their tactics and their style of working with clients.
This article will first briefly sketch the history of poor people's
lawyers from the late 1800s to the early 1960s, when in 1964, for the first
time, the federal government allocated substantial funding to lawyers for
" Visiting Lecturer, Research Scholar, and Director, Arthur Liman Public Interest Program, Yale
Law School. My deep thanks to Duffy Graham for his advice and editorial help.
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the poor. The article will then focus on the work of lawyers in the 1960s,
examining their strategy to create a constitutionally-based "right to live."
Finally, the article will discuss the demise of that strategy and poverty
lawyers' subsequent assessment of more effective ways to practice law for
poor people.
The work of poor people's lawyers remains vital today. Poverty
lawyers currently have a larger number of poor clients than their
predecessors, as the disparity in income between the poor and the wealthy
continues to expand, and the current political climate is at best indifferent to
the needs of the poor. Poverty lawyers continue to struggle with how best
to serve the poor.
EARLY PROVISION OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR
The organized provision of legal services to the poor in the United
States developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the onset
of full-scale industrial society. The earliest legal services for the poor
almost exclusively came through private or municipally-funded legal aid
societies. Legal aid societies operated in several large cities and some
smaller cities, but seldom in rural areas. The organizations generally
worked without consulting their counterparts, and there was no national or
coordinated structure for legal assistance to the poor.
The earliest legal aid society was established in New York City in
1876 and provided, as its original mission, free legal assistance to poor
2
German immigrants. It called itself, simply, the Legal Aid Society. By
1889, it had expanded its services to all poor persons. The Legal Aid
Society exemplified the poverty law practice of the day. It focused on
serving individual clients with respect to whatever legal problem was
presented by the client. It did not attempt to survey the poor community to
determine what its most pressing problems might be or whether the law
might present any opportunity for systematic change.
1. See generally EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (Greenwood
Press 1951); see also William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal
Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. LOuiS U.
PUB. L. REV. 241, 242-46 (1998).
2. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1960-1973, 11 (Yale University Press 1993).
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Consequently, the scope and content of the Society's legal work was
random, driven by the specific problems brought in by clients. Further, the
Society relied heavily on financial contributions from lawyers in private
practice and, as such, was reluctant to venture into legal areas that might
either offend the political sensibilities of its financial supporters or appear
to be in direct business competition with them. On the other hand, it was
reluctant to solicit municipal funds as it did not want to be subjected to the
"uglier side of New York politics" - rampant cronyism. The Society
wished to retain its attorneys solely based on "fitness". In other words, it
wanted to hire an attorney because she wished to work with the poor, not
because her uncle held an important position in city government.
Settlement houses developed at around the same time as legal aid
6
societies. Settlement houses solicited college educated- men or women to
live in poor neighborhoods with the "laboring classes" so the college-
educated could better understand the conditions of the poor and the need for
reform.' Settlement house members generally were not lawyers.
8
However, as they worked with neighbors on issues of unemployment, child
labor, and women's health, members quickly saw the need for, and role of,
law reform. 9 Unlike legal aid societies, settlement houses focused on
structural change and relied on political and social organizing.1l Further,
settlement house members advocated for more balanced lives for their
neighbors and encouraged them to participate in recreation and art.' The
settlement house interest in promoting cultural and physical-health
opportunities for the working class, in addition to improving economic
status, distinguished it from other social service organizations at the time."
The contrast between a legal aid society's work on individual cases on
a first-come, first-served basis and a settlement house's selective case work
3. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 15; see also Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in
Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805, 808 (1967) (remarking that many legal aid
societies relied on Community Chest or United Funds and "because landlords and merchants are
likely to be important contributors to these charities, a Legal Aid attorney who acts aggressively
against such persons jeopardizes the society's income").
4. JOHN M. MAGUIRE, THE LANCE OF JUSTICE: A SEMI-CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
LEGAL AID SOCIETY 1876-1926, 255-56 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982).
5. Id. at 255.
6. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 13.
7. Id. See also JANE ADDAMS, FORTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE (1935) (describing her life at
Hull House in Chicago from the late 1800s to the early 1900s).
8. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 14.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. ADDAMS, supra note 7, at 342-99.
12. Id. at 125-27.
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with the goal of structural reform represents a conflict regarding the role of
poverty advocates in society that has endured throughout the history of
poverty work. Under the legal aid society model, lawyers should meet the
poor person's individualized legal problems. 13 The greater problem is not
so much that social or political institutions are improperly set up or
unavailable to the poor, but that the poor lack legal counsel necessary to
maneuver through the institutions. 14 The role of poverty lawyers is to guide
their clients through the system and help them follow the rules.' 5 Thus, the
poor gain access to those benefits to which they are entitled - nothing more
and nothing less. 16 Under the settlement house model, advocates, including
lawyers, should challenge the basic social and political institutions because
those institutions are created and operated by people unconcerned with the
lives of the poor and uninterested in changing conditions for the poor.17
The problems of an individual client are important only to the extent that
they illustrate the underlying problem with a social or political institution."
Legal advocacy is part of a larger strategy that has as its goal systemic
reform. 19 Lawyers work with organizers, social workers, and lay advocates
20
for coordinated change in many different arenas.
In the early 1900s, many settlement houses aligned themselves with
the Progressive political platform, which included support for labor unions,
21women's suffrage, and limitations on child labor. Wealthy patrons of the
settlement houses were displeased with such an alignment and cut financial
22support to the houses. Many settlement houses were unable to find
replacement funding and closed. After that, legal aid societies were often
the primary providers of services to the poor and, thus, its model of
24
individual client service predominated. However, in the early 1960s, the
model of lawyer as grand strategist came forward once again in New York.
Not surprisingly, it sprung from a settlement house.




17. Id. at 2-3.
18. Id. at 14.
19. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 14.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 14-15.




History of Poverty Lawyers
LEGAL SERVICES DURING THE WAR
ON POVERTY
One of the original settlement houses was Henry Street Settlement,
serving the lower east side of New York. It opened in 1893 as a visiting
nurse program run by two nurses, Lillian Wald and Mary Brewster.25 By
1895, Wald had garnered a patron who agreed the nurses' work needed to
expand to include other community work, and purchased Wald and
26Brewster a house on Henry Street. The house became a neighborhood
center for reform campaigns concerning tenement conditions, children's
health, workers' rights, women's suffrage and other issues raised by
27neighbors. Henry Street Settlement flourished under Wald's direction,
and, after her retirement, under the direction of Helen Hall, who came to
Henry Street in 1933.28
In 1957, the staff at Henry Street crafted a detailed juvenile
delinquency prevention plan that moved away from the prevailing model of
mental health casework, and proposed instead a model to create
opportunities for at-risk youth to participate constructively in their
community.29 True to its settlement house history, the plan envisioned
organizing and mobilizing the community through its parents, teachers,
recreation sponsors and the like to alter the social structure.
The program was funded as Mobilization for Youth (MFY) in 1962
with a combination of federal, city, foundation, and private funds.3° MFY
did not originally include legal services, but its staff quickly saw the clients'
need for legal advice along with social services. By 1963, MFY added a
legal unit and hired Edward Sparer as its legal director.31
Sparer came to MFY with a background as a labor organizer. He
25. BEATRICE SIEGEL, LILLIAN WALD OF HENRY STREET 31-42 (Beatrice Siegel, 1983).
26. Id. at 42.
27. See generally SIEGEL, supra note 25.
28. See generally HELEN HALL, UNFINISHED BUSINESS (1971).
29. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 27-28.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 28-29. The Ford Foundation provided funding for the legal unit and in addition to
funding MFY, it funded three other similar programs placing legal services within a larger
multiservice social agency. The three programs were located in Boston, New Haven, and
Washington, D.C. See Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor - A
Commentary, 83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1672 (1995).
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dropped out of college in 1949 to pursue labor organizing on behalf of the
Communist Party.32 He left the Communist Party in 1956 after learning the
details of Stalin's murderous purge in the Soviet Union during the 1930s
and 1940s.33 He then enrolled in Brooklyn Law School (the administration
was willing to admit him without a college degree) and was graduated in
1959.34 He remained passionate about union organizing and committed to
social activism, and had a strong vision of the role of the lawyer in that
activism. For Sparer, a lawyer was not
merely a technician whose function was to help the. . . system
conform to what the elected representatives of the majority had
decreed it should be. [The lawyer's] mission was to utilize the legal
process to help change the very nature of the . . . system and, thereby,
to change the ground rules of American society.
Sparer saw MFY as the perfect place to start his structural reform
work and welfare laws. Given its prominent role and institutional responses
to poverty, it was the perfect target.
Sparer had sympathetic anti-poverty colleagues in Jean and Edgar
Cahn, two politically active lawyers in Washington, D.C. The Cahns both
were graduated from Yale Law School in 1962 and remained in New Haven
to establish Community Progress, Inc. (CPI), a Ford Foundation-funded
pilot project in New Haven. CPI was designed as a community-based
social services program and included a "neighborhood law office" staffed
by Jean Cahn and another lawyer.37 The Calms moved to Washington D.C.
in 1963, where Edgar worked as special counsel and speech writer to
38Attorney General Robert Kennedy. As President Johnson announced his
War on Poverty, the Cahns began an astute campaign to include funding for
legal services in the developing anti-poverty legislation.
Jean and Edgar Cahn were adamant that any new legal services
delivery system actively include a "civilian perspective" . The Cahns
32. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 23.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 24-25.
35. Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS - WHAT THEY
ARE, WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 84 (Norman Dorsen ed., Pantheon Books 1971).
36. Biography of Jean and Edgar Cahn, available at
http://nejl.wcl.american.edu/cahnarticle.html.
37. Id. The other lawyer was Frank Dineen who continues his work today in New Haven as a
poverty lawyer. Dineen is currently the deputy director of New Haven Legal Assistance
Association and an adjunct clinical professor at Yale Law School.
38. See http://www.timedollar.org/About / 20us/AboutEdgarCahn.htm.
39. Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317
[Vol. 5
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believed that poverty could not be ended solely by "a war - fought by
professionals on behalf of the civilian population," but that civilians needed
to be trained and encouraged to become "indigenous leaders" in order to
empower their own communities.4 0  The Cahns emphasized citizen
involvement, rather than impact litigation, out of concern that attorneys
pursued litigation without client involvement or input.
The Cahns knew the Johnson administration included a handful of
social scientists brought on during the prior administration of John F.
Kennedy, including Leonard Cottrell. Cottrell strongly believed that local
communities must be involved in designing and implementing social
42services. His sociology research was the basis for Henry Street Settlement
House's juvenile delinquency prevention plan. He was also the chairperson
of the federal grantmaking agency providing funds to MFY in 1962.
Cottrell joined the Kennedy administration in 1960 to work on a nascent
anti-poverty program being developed under the rubric of juvenile• 41
delinquency prevention. In fact, it was the work of Cottrell and his
colleagues that formed the basis for President Johnson's War on Poverty.44
Ultimately, Johnson's anti-poverty legislation passed in 1964 and
created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The new head of the
office was Sargent Shriver, the brother-in-law of deceased President John F.
Kennedy. Jean and Edgar Cahn then convinced Shriver that certain OEO
funds should be earmarked for legal services, and by 1965, he had a
separate Legal Services Program within the OEO.45 By 1966, OEO had
committed $27.5 million to legal services programs throughout the country,
46in large and small cities as well as in rural areas. OEO funded some
existing legal aid societies, but most of the programs it funded were newly
created by poverty lawyers. By 1967, funding had increased to over $40
41
million to 300 legal services programs.
For the first time, the United States had an integrated system of legal
services for the poor. The legal services guidelines issued by the OEO
reflected both the Cahns' vision of neighborhood legal offices, grounded in
(1964).
40. Cahn, supra note 39, at 1329-34.
4l. Id. at 1321-22.
42. DANIEL KNAPP & KENNETH POLK, SCOUTING THE WAR ON POVERTY: SOCIAL REFORM
POLITICS IN THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION 26-29 (1971).
43. Id. at 13, 53-57.
44. Id. at 13.
45. HOUSEMAN, supra note 31, at 1673-76; see also note, Neighborhood Law Offices, supra
note 3, at 806.
46. Note, Neighborhood Law Offices, supra note 3, at 806.
47. Quigley, supra note 1, at 248.
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local communities, and Edward Sparer's vision of poverty lawyers as social
reformers. 48 The guidelines called for each neighborhood legal program to
have community members on its board and encouraged programs to
represent poor persons' organizations.49  As the director of the Legal
Services Program stated in 1965:
Lawyers must be activists to leave a contribution to society. The law
is more than a control; it is an instrument for social change. The role
of [the] OEO program is to provide the means within the democrafic
process for law and lawyers to release the bonds which imprison
people in poverty, to marshal the forces of law to combat the causes
and effects of poverty.
50
In a further effort to coordinate local legal services work and to help
support law reform, the OEO also created and funded a new kind of legal
services program: the support center.51 Support centers canvassed field
programs for possible test cases that could be used to raise systemic
challenges to poverty. Support centers also provided technical assistance
and training to advocates in field programs and acted as clearinghouses to
ensure that local and regional developments were shared across the52
country.
Additionally, the OEO created fellowships to support one to two years
of work by new poverty lawyers. The fellowships were named after
Reginald Heber Smith, a one time legal aid lawyer and then private
practitioner in Boston. In 1919, Smith published the results of an
extraordinarily comprehensive nationwide study of the system used to
53deliver legal services to the poor. Smith concluded in his survey that the
poor were not receiving adequate legal services and that poverty lawyers
would make more of a difference if they focused on broad legal reforms.54
Smith's survey did not lead to radical restructuring of legal services for the
48. When Edgar and Jean Cahn finished their work on the OEO legislation they remained in
Washington D.C. In 1972, they founded Antioch School of Law, the first clinical law school in
the country. They left Antioch in 1980 after a dispute with Antioch University over fiscal
autonomy for the law school. In 1987, the Calms founded the Time Dollar Institute which
supports community efforts to create service exchange programs (one hour of community service
equals a "time dollar" that can be exchanged for another time dollar of some other community
service). Jean Cahn died in 1991 and Edgar Cahn continues his work with the Institute. See
http://www.timedollar.org/About%20us/About-Edgar_Cahn.htm.
49. HOUSEMAN, supra note 31, at 1676-77.
50. Quigley, supra note 1, at 246.
51. Id. at 248; see also Houseman, supra note 31, at 1682-83.
52. Alan W. Houseman, Can Legal Services Achieve Equal Justice, at
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/legalservices/dialogue.htm.
53. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 16.
54. Id.
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poor, but he is widely credited as the "father of modern legal aid." 55 The
"Reggie" fellowships, as they were known, were prestigious and attracted
56applicants who were bright, energetic, and zealous. During the first two
years of Johnson's War on Poverty, the Reggies, the new legal services
programs, and the support centers combined to create a new network of
poverty lawyers across the country. The OEO encouraged the new network
to provide direct client services, reform litigation, client education, and
community outreach.
This was the setting in which Edward Sparer and others developed
their legal strategy to create what they referred to as a right to live. Sparer
conceived of the "right to live" as a fundamental opportunity for every
person in the United States to have enough resources to feed, clothe, and
house herself. If people could not do that on their own, then the
government had a constitutional obligation to provide such necessary
support. Sparer's right-to-live strategy culminated in the case Goldberg v.
Kelly.
GOLDBERG V. KELLY
In 1967, John Kelly was a twenty-nine-year-old disabled, homeless,
black man receiving welfare in New York. His welfare worker had
ordered him to move into a single room occupancy hotels8 Kelly knew was
full of drunks and addicts.59 Kelly moved into a friend's apartment without
his caseworker's permission, resulting in the cancellation of his welfare
benefits. 60 Kelly's only financial resource had been his welfare checks, and
without them he was unable to cover his share of the apartment rent or pay
61 62for food. I He was forced to sleep on the street.
Although welfare regulations did not permit the caseworker's actions,
Kelly had no way of challenging them before his benefits were terminated.
His only option was to challenge his caseworker's actions afterwards and
55. See 1998 Reggie Reunion, excerpted at http://www.equaljusticelibrary.
org.cnchost.com/alumninews.asp.
56. See 1998 Reggie Reunion, excerpted at http://www.equaljusticelibrary.
org.cnchost.com/alumninews.asp.
57. Complaint of John Kelly, et al. v. George K. Wyman, Civ. No. 394-1968 (United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York), excerpted in R. COVER, 0. FiSs & J.
RESNIK, PROCEDURE, 61-64 (1st ed. 1988) (hereinafter Kelly Complaint).
58. Single room occupancy (SRO) hotels are mainly used as temporary housing by those who
are homeless and are often characterized by their marked dilapidation.
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hope to have his benefits reinstated, 63 a process that could take anywhere
64
from a month to almost a year. During that time, Mr. Kelly would have
no source of income.
John Kelly's case was not unique. He went to the MFY office, told
his story, and learned MFY attorneys were looking for plaintiffs like him.
The lawyers wanted to challenge the welfare department's practice of
terminating benefits the moment a caseworker determined a recipient
ineligible. Rather, they wanted to allow the recipient an opportunity to
challenge the ineligibility finding before benefits were terniinated. Poverty
lawyers throughout New York City had reported that the welfare
department used the threat of termination as a powerful weapon to cow
recipients and discourage them from complaining about the treatment they
65received from their caseworkers. MFY's lawyers reasoned the first step in
creating a right to live was to have procedural safeguards in place to prevent
66improper termination of welfare benefits.
MFY argued that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibited New York from terminating welfare benefits
without first providing a hearing at which the recipient could challenge the
action. 67 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.. .. ,6869 I
MFY argued that welfare benefits were property, just like land or a car. If
MFY could convince a court that welfare benefits were property, then
existing case law would support the proposition that due process required a
hearing before welfare benefits could be deprived by termination.
At the time the case was being developed, the notion that welfare
70
benefits constituted a legal property right was novel. Unlike land, a car,
or even patents, welfare benefits were considered by many lawyers and lay
persons to be charity. As largess, welfare could be given or taken away
arbitrarily, even at the whim of a mean-spirited case worker. However,
legal scholars had recently challenged that view.
In 1964, law professor Charles Reich, published an article entitled




67. Id. at 96.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 84-86.
70. Id. at 85-86.
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"The New Property." 7 1 He argued that individuals were becoming more
dependent on objects such as driver's licenses, professional licenses,
government contracts, agricultural subsidies, veteran's benefits and welfare
as means of support. Reich asserted that if our society continued to
depend on these objects, then it must be willing to grant the status of
"property" to ensure the government did not abridge important individual
rights and freedoms. Reich argued that the granting of largess gives power
to a government, and that if power is not checked, such as by the Bill of
Rights, then the power increases to such an extent that individuals become
powerless. As Reich noted:
[T]he growth of government power based on the dispensing of wealth
must be kept within bounds.... [T]here must be a zone of privacy for
each individual beyond which neither government nor private power
can push - a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation
and control. Finally, it must be recognized that we are becoming a
society based upon relationship and status - status deriving primarily
from source of livelihood. Status is so closely linked to personality
that destruction of one may well destroy the other. Status must
therefore be surrounded with the kind of safeguards once reserved for
personality.
74
John Kelly's attorneys incorporated Reich's analysis into Kelly's
lawsuit. If the lawsuit were successful, and the court were to find that
welfare benefits were property deserving of procedural protection, then a
major social shift would follow. The creation of a substantive property
interest would ensure procedural protections. The orderly use of procedure
would then protect welfare recipients from arbitrary demands of their
caseworkers. Orderly process would fuel the welfare rights movement.
The case was filed in federal district court on January 29, 1968, and
included five other plaintiffs who had stories similar to Kelly's.7 5  After
some preliminary maneuvering by both sides, the case was assigned to a
71. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
72. Id. at 734-37.
73. Id. at 746-56.
74. Id. at 785.
75. The five other plaintiffs all arbitrarily had their welfare benefits terminated. Their stories
are detailed in the Kelly Complaint, supra note 58, at 61-72. The case was captioned, John Kelly
et al. v. George K. Wyman. Wyman was then the commissioner of the State of New York
Department of Social Services. Also named as defendants were the commissioner of the
Department of Social Services for the City of New York and all members of the State of New
York Board of Social Welfare. When Wyman was replaced by Jack Goldberg as state
commissioner, Goldberg was substituted as the defendant. Thus, when the state ultimately
appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, it was known as Goldberg v. Kelly.
20031
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76special three-judge panel at the plaintiffs' request. The court granted the
request for the unusual process, recognizing the case raised an important
constitutional issue. On November 26, 1968, the three-judge panel issued
its decision finding that welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing before
their benefits were terminated.77 It was a monumental success for plaintiffs.
The defendants quickly appealed the case to the United States
78Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court refused to stay the lower
court's ruling pending the appeal, the pendency of the case left the new
right to a pre-termination hearing in doubt.79 The case was argued to the
Supreme Court in November 1969, almost a year after the original decision
was issued.
As part of the case presented to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor
General of the United States submitted a brief in support of the State of
New York, opposing pre-termination hearings.8° The Solicitor General's
brief was replete with statistics about the number of requests for pre-
termination hearings filed by welfare recipients across the country. As one
of the participating poverty lawyers noted, the Government clearly intended
for the Court to read the recitation "as evidence of turmoil that must be
staunched. ' '81 The Government hoped the Court would be unwilling to risk
that social turmoil.
82The Supreme Court issued its decision on March 23, 1970. Justice
Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by six other justices. Citing
Reich's "The New Property" as one of several bases for the decision,
Brennan agreed with the lower court that "[t]he stakes are simply too high
for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable
misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the
recipient a chance" for a pre-termination hearing. 83 Brennan stated that the
government did have a legitimate interest in keeping down the costs of
administering welfare, but concluded that the Government "is not without
weapons to minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and
76. See Notice of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Convening of Three-Judge Court and




79. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Because no stay was granted, New York was
obligated to provide pre-termination hearings during the pendency of the case.
80. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 895 (1968).
81. Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 805-08 (1990).
82. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266, citing Kelly, 294 F. Sup. at 904-05.
83. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266, in Kelly, 294 F. Supp. at 904-05.
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administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for
prompt pre-termination hearings and by skillful use of personnel and
facilities.",
84
Brennan further stated: "Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
life of the community., 85  Under Brennan's analysis, welfare had an
important role in creating social change, and procedural due process would
be used to ensure that social change was orderly.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
GOLDBERG v. KELLY
With the Goldberg decision, poverty lawyers hoped they had gained
important support for their ultimate claim of a right to live. However, only
one month later, the Supreme Court issued another welfare-related decision
in Dandridge v. Williams.86 At issue in Dandridge was whether a state
could set a maximum amount to its welfare grant at a level that was clearly
less than the federally-determined standard of need for the recipient
87children. Under the maximum grant rules, the size of the grants to
recipient children could vary depending on the size of the family.88 A
family with eight eligible children received the same amount of money as a
family with seven children, so the children in the larger family had smaller
grants.89 In Dandridge, the grant amount for each child in the larger family
was less than the standard of need. If there were ever to be a right to live,
then the Court in Dandridge would have to hold unconstitutional grants that
were less than the standard of need.
The plaintiffs in Dandridge relied on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a state cannot "den to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' They
argued that the clause barred a state from treating large needy families
84. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
85. Id. at 265.
86. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
87. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
88. Id. at 473.
89. Id. at 473-75.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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differently than smaller needy families. 9' However, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument.92 Although the Court had held that welfare recipients
were entitled to a pre-termination hearing, it now held that a state had no
constitutional obligation under the Equal Protection Clause to provide a
certain minimum amount of welfare.
93
The Dandridge decision shocked poverty lawyers, coming so soon
after Goldberg and without any change in the membership on the Court.
Sparer, by then teaching at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, felt
particularly disturbed by the result in Dandridge and believed that the
possibilities for a right to live that had been present in decisions before
Dandridge were now "aborted." 94 He noted later that a
contrary result in Dandridge would have permitted wholesale
challenges to the barriers created by state legislatures and Congress to
deny welfare assistance to groups of needy people .... The equal
protection clause would have become the main vehicle for establishing
a constitutional guarantee of human life ... [and] could have led to a
different America.95
During the following Supreme Court term in 1971, the Court further
stunned poverty lawyers with its decision in Wyman v. James.96 In Wyman,
the Court considered whether a welfare recipient could refuse to allow her
caseworker to search her home without losing welfare benefits.97 The lower
court had ruled that a case worker who searched a recipient's home without
a warrant violated both the Fourth Amendment (prohibiting illegal
searches) and the recipient's right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment.99 The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff, Barbara
James, raised her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims at her pre-
termination hearing, and the hearing officer ruled against her.100 The Court
held that since the City of New York provided Ms. James with a pre-
termination hearing, it had satisfied the requirements of Goldberg v.
Kelly.'
01
91. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 483.
92. Id. at 486.
93. Id.
94. SPARER, supra note 35, at 82.
95. Id.
96. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
97. Id. at 310.
98. Id. at 312-13.
99. Id. at 326.
100. Id. at 313.
101. Id. at 313-14.
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The Court then considered whether the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches prohibited New York from requiring its
welfare recipients to consent to a home visit in order to maintain benefits. 
2
The Court concluded that although the home "is one of the most precious
aspects of personal security," a home visit was not unconstitutional.103 The
Court stated the search was reasonable, in part, because "[o]ne who
dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to
know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public,
when it is the provider, rightly expects the same."'' 0 4 Thus, one year after
Goldberg had recognized government benefits as property and mandated
procedures to protect it, the Court spoke once again of government
largess.1
05
In 1972, the Court yet again made clear that it would not embrace a
constitutional right to live and reaffirmed that states have discretion to
determine how to administer their welfare programs. In Jefferson v.
Hackney,'°6 the Court considered whether Texas could constitutionally pay
a lower amount of welfare benefits to recipients in the AFDC program than
it did to recipients in the aged, blind and disabled welfare program.
Plaintiffs argued the Texas distribution plan was racially biased since most
AFDC recipients were black or Hispanic, while most recipients in the aged,
blind and disabled program were white. °7 The Court concluded that the
statistics presented by the plaintiffs showing racial differences between
recipients in the programs did not establish that the state was intentionally
discriminating against non-white welfare recipients.1l The Court stated
that it was "not irrational" for Texas to conclude that the aged, blind and
disabled needed more assistance than did AFDC recipients and "[w]hether
or not one agrees with this state determination, there is nothing in the
Constitution that forbids it."1°9
In later reflections on Goldberg and its progeny, one of the lead
plaintiffs' attorneys, Sylvia Law, discussed the alternative legal theories the
102. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 316.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 319.
105. Justice Douglas dissented in Wyman and started his dissent with a citation to Reich's The
New Property noting that the "central question [in the case] is whether the government by force of
its largess has the power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 327-28.
Justices Brennan and Marshall jointly dissented as well, writing separately from Douglas. Id. at
338.
106. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
107. Id. at 538.
108. Id. at 549.
109. Id.
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Goldberg attorneys had considered and why they chose a rights-based
argument. 10 One of the primary reasons was that
our clients [the Goldberg plaintiffs] liked "rights". They trusted
"rights" more than [the legal concept] "fundamental fairness"....
Ours is a culture that values rights, and poor people share the values of
our culture .... Vulnerable people have good reason to prefer the
harder edge of rights to the hope that others whose lives are very
different will be able to empathize with them. III
Nonetheless, as welfare recipients and their attorneys learned from
Goldberg and its progeny, establishing a right in court one day does not
mean that the next day the government cannot take that right away or so
encumber the right to render it meaningless.
Goldberg and its companion cases illustrate the challenges of a rights-
based strategy. Nonetheless, advocates, politicians, judges, and presidents
have continued to look to the creation of rights as a way to address systemic
social problems. For example, in recent years, the Equal Pay Act has
guaranteed women the right to the same level of pay as men.' 12 The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has promised workers fort
years or older the same right to employment as younger employees.'
Finally, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has promised people
with disabilities the right to have an employer accommodate those
disabilities on the job. I However, the challenges and risks of a rights-
based strategy have not dissipated.
Under the tenure of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court has
issued several decisions making it extremely difficult for individuals to sue
state governments for violations of rights created by the statutes identified
above. For example, the Court has held that state governments may not be
sued in federal court for violating the ADEA or ADA. 1 5 The Court
reasoned in both cases that Congress improperly abridged a state's right to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.' 6  The Court's
110. LAW, supra note 81, at 805.
111. Id. at 816.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1967).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
115. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (addressing the ADEA); Bd. of
Trustees, Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (addressing the ADA).
116. The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "[jiudicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
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decisions only invalidated federal lawsuits against state employers: both
statutes apply to employers other than a state government and both permit
lawsuits in state courts as well as federal courts. Nonetheless, the Court's
rulings demonstrate its close scrutiny of individual rights created by
legislation.
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE TO GOLDBERG AND THE
STRATEGY OF TEST CASE LITIGATION
The establishment of OEO and nationwide federal funding initiated
explosive growth in law reform work. In the 89 years before the OEO, not
one legal aid society attorney took a case to the United States Supreme
Court. In the first five years of federally-funded legal services, funded
attorneys argued 219 cases to the Court and won seventy-three of them."
8
The success in Goldberg and other litigation seeking to establish rights and
structural reform on behalf of the poor fueled the test case strategy and
caught the attention of state and federal politicians. The political response,
in turn, disheartened poverty lawyers.
Governors in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, and Missouri
took steps to cut off state legal services funding to poverty programs in their119
states that had successfully promoted law reform. The efforts of then-
Governor Ronald Reagan to deprive California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA) of funding developed into a public fight."' In 1967, CRLA had
successfully sued the State of California to restore $200 million in funds
improperly removed from California's Medicaid program. 121  Reagan,
consequently unable to fulfill his campaign pledge to balance the state
budget, vindictively sought to end CRLA's federal funding.122 Ultimately,
in 1970, Reagan vetoed the California grant from OEO, blocking funds to
CRLA. Through negotiations, the OEO grant was restored, but Reagan
would hold dear the animosity he felt towards federally-funded legal
services programs. 113
Legal services activities had also caught the attention of President
Nixon, whose gaze was less than adoring. In 1971, supporters of OEO
introduced federal legislation to create a legal services program independent
117. Quigley, supra note 1, at 250.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 250-51.
120. Id. at 248.
121. Id. at 248-49.
122. Id. at 248-50.
123. Quigley, supra note 1, at 250-5 1.
124. Id. at 252.
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• 125
of OEO, in the form of a federal corporation. They hoped that the
proposed corporation could better insulate legal services from political126 • • 127
pressure. Nixon opposed the legislation. He offered his own version,
under which legal services programs would be barred from representing
groups, legislative lobbying, and other potentially broad impact activites.
Congress did not pass any legislation, and the debate continued.
The next year, Vice President Spiro Agnew wrote an article in the
American Bar Association Journal entitled "What's Wrong with the Legal
Services Program."' 129  The article stated the Nixon administration's
position on the role of federally-funded legal services. Agnew repeated
Nixon's demand that Congress "create an agency 'which places the needs
of low-income clients first, before the political concerns of either legal
services attorneys or elected officials. Agnew argued that law reform
work did not adequately respect the attorney-client relationship because it
gave too much control to the attorney.13 1 Instead, Agnew argued, legal
services attorneys were improperly using federal money to engage in a
"systematic effort to redistribute societal advantages and disadvantages,
penalties and rewards, rights and resources."' 132 Agnew then asked:
Is this simple advocacy? Or is it social engineering on a grand scale
and without accountability to anyone?... As it operates now, it is a
public project but without public direction or public accountability."'
3 3
He concluded that "basic attitudes within this [the legal services]
program should be changed. So long as individual attorneys conceive
their role to be that of social engineers, they will continue to
exacerbate community tensions and undermine the very purposes they
were hired to accomplish. 1
34
Although Agnew argued that poverty lawyers should put their clients'
needs first, his vision was not the "civilian perspective" articulated by Jean
and Edgar Cahn, under which clients were to be encouraged to become
community leaders. Instead, Agnew argued for a return to the practice of
the old legal aid societies under which an attorney's role is to help the poor




129. Spiro Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930 (1972).
130. Id. (quoting President Nixon's veto comments on the 1971 legislation to establish the
Legal Services Corporation).
131. Id. at 931.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 932.
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move smoothly through the system, not change it. For poverty lawyers
energized by their law reform work, Agnew's words were a bitter portent.
Congress established the new federal Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) in July 1974 after much haggling and compromise over its
structure.135 In the end, the LSC structure was fundamentally the same as
the OEO legal services program. B 6  LSC would receive an annual
congressional appropriation and would then grant money to local legal
services programs and state and national support centers. 37  For the
remainder of the 1970s, LSC operated under relative calm and saw its
appropriation rise from $90 million to $300 million in 1980.138 The election
of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980 marked a change in fortune for the
LSC.
Reagan's enmity for legal services had not abated since his fury at
CRLA as California's governor. Reagan supported efforts to defund and
dismantle LSC and, during his tenure, LSC funding either declined or
remained relatively commensurate with the 1980 funding level. 139 Thus,
funding did not keep pace with inflation or other cost increases. Further,
Congress restricted LSC-funded programs from undertaking certain
activities including legislative lobbying, representing aliens, and accepting
certain types of fee-generating cases.
During this time period, legal services programs continued to bring
and win lawsuits that brought about systemic changes in government
institutions serving the poor. For example, the result of one such lawsuit in
California was to prohibit counties from refusing to provide general
assistance benefits to the homeless because the homeless lacked a
permanent address.141 Poverty lawyers also helped their clients successfully
challenge a practice of forcing an indigent into a county-run facility before
the person could receive benefits, even if the person had a permanent
home. 1
42
Although Reagan successfully curtailed some of the law reform work
of legal services programs, he was unable to eliminate it. 143 However, some
135. Houseman, supra note 31, at 2.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id.
138. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 255; see also LSC Statistics: Annual Appropriations 1980-
2001, available at http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr_aLSCa.htm.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 258.
141. Nelson v. Board of Supervisors, 190 Cal. App. 3d 25 (1987).
142. Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P. 2d 695 (Cal. 1985).
143. Quigley, supra note 1, at 256.
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members of Congress shared Reagan's concerns, and in 1995, long after
Reagan had left office, Congress took up the issue of LSC funding. The
1995 Congress passed legislation reducing the LSC appropriation by thirty
percent and further restricted the kinds of cases that could be handled by
LSC-funded programs. 144 Programs were barred from: initiating class
action lawsuits, a common vehicle for law reform; pursuing claims for
attorneys' fees, a common source of additional program financing; and
seeking to reform federal or state welfare systems. Further, Congress
entirely defunded the support centers, many of which had created strong
reputations as leaders in structural reform litigation.
146
The debate in Congress was venomous, as debates often are on issues
related to social reform. For example, one opponent contended that LSC
was "one of the most reckless and irresponsible agencies to have ever been
created by the federal government"14 and that it had "an appalling and
inexcusable record of all too often taking money from law-abiding, hard-
working taxpayers and then giving it to the likes of convicted felons,
delinquent fathers, illegal aliens and drug dealers." 148 Supporters countered
that legal services programs were essential to a fair justice system and that
poverty lawyers were "highly dedicated professionals with widely
recognized records of achievement in their work ... [and] the
characterization of such individuals as political ideologues or militant
crazies is simply ludicrous .... ,149
The cut-backs took force in 1996, and, as a result, legal services
programs lost almost thirteen percent of their staff and almost thirteen
percent of legal services field offices were forced to close.' 50  Support
centers were decimated. Many kept their doors open only with skeletal
funding and staffs. 151
Since 1996, federally-funded legal services programs have continued
to operate, but most have been unable or unwilling to focus on work other
than individual services to individual clients. In some areas, the boards and
staffs of federally-funded programs have decided to spin off a counterpart
144. Houseman, supra note 31, at 4; Quigley, supra note 1, at 261-63.
145. Quigley, supra note 1, at 261-62.
146. Id.
147. Legal Services Corp. Reauthorization: H.R. Jud. Subcomm. Commercial and Admin. Law,
104th Cong (1995) (statement of Rep. Robert K. Doman), WL 1995 F.D.C.H. 446736.
148. Id.
149. Legal Services Corp. Reauthorization: H.R. Jud. Subcomm. Commercial and Admin. Law,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of John McKay, Chairman, Wash. Equal Justice Coalition), WL
1995 F.D.C.H. 365851.
150. Houseman, supra note 3 1, at 4.
151. Id.
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organization whose charge is to do "unrestricted" work - represent
immigrants, challenge welfare laws, and lobby. However, many of the spin
off organizations are tightly funded, limiting their ability to go pursue
expensive and time-consuming social reform litigation. Further, splitting
organizations up into "restricted" and "unrestricted" camps has renewed the
tension between legal services attorneys as providers of individualized
technical advice and as instigators of social reform. Many poverty lawyers
liken restricted programs to the old legal aid societies and regard
unrestricted programs as the main hope for rights-based litigation and
systemic reform work.
NEW STRATEGIES
As the judiciary and the legislature responded to litigation successes,
facilitated, in part, by the establishment of a nationwide network of
community-based poverty law offices, poverty lawyers themselves revised
their strategies. They questioned whether litigation was the best mechanism
to achieve their goal of permanently restructuring social institutions and
processes to benefit the poor.
During the 1980s, legal services lawyers began to consider openly
whether the way in which they practiced their craft and worked with clients
was truly bringing about the social reform they desired. In the late 1980s,
two poverty lawyers, Lucie White and Gerald Lopez, challenged the
predominant thinking in a series of law review articles.15 2 Lucie White had
been a poverty lawyer in rural North Carolina when, in 1985, she visited the
community of Driefontein in South Africa. 153 Driefontein was a black
farming community in a "white-designated" area, and the South African
government sought to relocate community members into black
homelands. The community successfully combated the government's
efforts with the help of a white organizer and a white lawyer, both of whom
became welcomed members of the community. 155 Lucie White gathered
stories from community members, the organizer, and the-lawyer about their
experiences and drew some lessons about effective lawyering from those
152. See Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wisc. L. REv. 699 (1988); Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1984), Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 73 GEO. L. J. 1603 (1989) and Training Future Lawyers to Work with the
Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305
(1989).
153. White, supra note 152, at 702.
154. Id. at 719-20.
155. Id. at 719-45.
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stories.156
White identified a three-tiered model of lawyering. She described
first-tier lawyering as pursuing an issue "through established channels of
political disputing" where the focus is "on the official, public political
contests that groups enter, how those contests are conducted, and, most
importantly, who wins."'157  In second-tier lawyering, "the lawyer
acknowledges that litigation can sometimes work directly to change the
allocation of social power. However, she [the lawyer] sees these effects as
secondary to law's deeper function in stimulating progressive change. 158
Finally, third-tier lawyering involves helping a group learn how to interpret
moments of domination as opportunities for resistance. The lawyer cannot
simply dictate to the group what actions they must take .... The role of the
lawyer is to help the group learn a method of deliberation that will lead to
effective and responsible strategic action.1
59
White perceived that the Driefontein community used both second and
third-tier lawyering to avoid relocation. As White viewed it: "[T]he tasks
of the lawyer and organizer complemented each other in a single advocacy
strategy .... Thus, the two efforts - of negotiation and community work -
built upon one another. These were two aspects of a 'lawyering effort', in
which no single actor occupied the 'lawyer' role."' 160  White ultimately
concluded that third-tier lawyering was most effective in helping a• • 161
subordinated group understand the means and methods of its domination.
Her vision of third-tier lawyering stood in strong contrast to the
predominant lawyering method of poverty lawyers of the time, that of first-
tier lawyering.
Gerald Lopez posited a vision of lawyering similar to White's which
he called rebellious lawyering.162 Like White, Lopez was a poverty lawyer.
In his book, Rebellious Lawyering, Lopez used vignettes of various poverty
lawyers in practice to illustrate his charge that well-intentioned poverty
lawyers generally did not actually listen to their clients' stories, understand
their clients' backgrounds, or consider the skills and power that their
clients' possessed. "Regnant" lawyers, using Lopez' label, were so
156. White, supra note 152, at 719-45,
157. Id. at 748.
158. Id. at 758.
159. Id. at 763-64 (emphasis in original).
160. Id. at 766-67.
161. Id.
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focused on how a problem could be cast as a legal argument to establish or
enforce legal rights that they failed to see or understand the larger social
environment in which their clients lived. Thus, the legal solution crafted by
a regnant lawyer distanced the client and cast the client always as a victim.
As another rebellious lawyer has described it: "[Regnant] [l]awyers see
clients as persons to be helped, as powerless persons who need to have
problems solved through the intervention of the lawyer and her skills."' 64
In contrast, according to Lopez' vision, rebellious lawyers seek to
become a part of the community in which they practice, to help the
community organize and develop its members' own voices of protest and
advocacy. Rebellious lawyers move from an elitist position, where the
attorney determines the appropriate legal strategy even before the client has
told the specifics of her story, to a background position, where the lawyer
acts as facilitator and lets community members determine the scope of the
problem and design the appropriate solution. The rebellious lawyer steps in
to give technical help and advice, but does not assert control over the
process.
Third-tier lawyering and rebellious lawyering sounded new to most
legal services attorneys in the 1990s, but in many ways they portrayed the
very message that Jean and Edgar Cahn had put forward in 1964 as the
"civilian perspective" and had lobbied Sargent Shriver to include in his
development of legal services under OEO. What good did a lawyer do if
she won a case creating the right for a tenant to withhold rent because the
tenant's apartment was rat-infested, if, as a result, the landlord closed the
entire building and all the tenants lost their housing? In contrast, if the
lawyer had helped the tenants organize before bringing the lawsuit, the
tenants would be in a better position to protest the landlord's actions and
bring political pressure to bear on the local housing authority to intercede
and force the landlord to make the required improvements. The power of a
lawsuit becomes only one of many tools available for the community to use,
and not necessarily the primary tool.
Poverty lawyers also developed a related advocacy model called
holistic lawyering. Under holistic lawyering, the lawyer views herself as
164. Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level
Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 951 (1992).
165. Id. at 952-53.
166. See Calm, supra note 39. A community-centered model of lawyering was also suggested
early on by Stephen Wexler in his article, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049
(1970).
167. See Tanya Neiman, Creating Community by Implementing Holistic Approaches to Solving
Clients'Problems, Clearinghouse Review May-June 1999 at 19.
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part of a larger service group, all of whom hold the common goal of
understanding the true nature of the client's need and then crafting the best
solution, whether or not that ultimately involves legal services. For
example, a client comes to the lawyer and explains she is unable to pay a
doctor for care the doctor provided to her child, and the doctor has sued.
The holistic lawyer will look beyond the immediate legal problem of
responding to the lawsuit to determine whether the client's child is eligible
for free health care insurance under Medicaid, whether there are other social
services available to the client that might help her improve her level of
income, and whether the family might be eligible for other government
benefits such as food stamps. The lawyer as a part of a larger advocacy
network is able to help not only with the legal problem, but also with more
basic problems that created the legal problem. 168  The lawyer does not
necessarily see herself or legal action as having any more important place in
the service network than any of the other providers or their activities.
61
Nor does she assume that the client's most pressing problem is a legal
problem just because the client has come to her door before some other
provider s. 70
As with rebellious lawyering, holistic lawyering has its origins in the
settlement houses and early multiservice programs like MFY. It shares in
its philosophy with third-tier and rebellious lawyering the view that the
client's full story is important, and the best response is not necessarily to
consider the legal system as the first or only solution. Each of the models
moves away from a rights-based strategy, although none reject the courts as
an important way of achieving social redress. Each emphasizes placing
the lawyer within the client's community and developing the skills already
held by clients.
Rebellious and holistic lawyers face the same situation as their legal
aid society colleagues faced a century ago: the need for individualized
services is enormous, and the daily pressure on a poverty lawyer to provide
the most immediate emergency legal help is severe. Poverty lawyers in
field offices have an unending stream of clients in the waiting room, many
of whom could be sent away with a quick-fix legal solution. While not
making any systemic change, this would at least provide some immediate
168. Neiman, supra note 167, at 19.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The rights-based strategy has been critiqued on several fronts, most importantly by the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. A central concern of CLS is whether it is viable to rely
on rights-based advocacy. Edward Sparer has provided his view of CLS in Fundamental Human
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
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individual relief- "rescue lawyering", as one commentator has labeled it.172
Organizing and mobilizing a community and making an effort to learn fully
about community problems takes time and requires lawyers to turn away
individual client work; something difficult for well-meaning lawyers
hoping to help everyone. It requires them to move out of the roles for which
they were trained in law school.
CONCLUSION
For over a century, lawyers in the United States working with the poor
have struggled with how best to use law and legal process to attack poverty
and assist the poor. Substantively, poverty lawyers have employed the
federal constitution; statutes, such as those related to labor law; and
regulations, such as those related to the Social Security Act.
Methodologically, poverty lawyers have employed tools such as lawsuits,
federal funding, and community organizing. They have learned that every
substantive challenge and every methodology likely causes a series of
reactions and responses. For example, poverty lawyers hoped that
Goldberg v. Kelly would be the first step to establishing a constitutional
right to live, but found the Supreme Court unwilling to go further. Poverty
lawyers also learned through experience with the OEO and the LSC that the
federal government's interest in paying for poverty lawyers can wax and
wane.
Despite poverty lawyers' work, the number of poor people increases
and the poor continue to have an ongoing need for legal assistance. Poverty
lawyers remain dedicated to their work, although they continue to disagree
about how best to practice. Some agree with Edward Sparer that a poverty
lawyer must be a grand strategist, while others are convinced that it is more
important to focus on an individual's legal problem. As noted above, the
debate is complicated by changes in the political climate and the judiciary.
For example, in 1964 the federal government was generous with its funding
for legal services and encouraged advocacy for systemic reform, but in
1995 it took the opposite approach and cut federal funds and encouraged
individual representation. Poverty lawyers have learned they must adapt
their advocacy to the political and judicial climate they find at the time.
In partial response to the need for adaptive strategies, poverty lawyers
have also considered new ways of working with their clients. Lucie White
and Gerald Lopez have argued that poverty lawyers should immerse
172. Tremblay, supra note 164, at 963-64.
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themselves in their clients' communities and not assume that lawyers are in
the best position to determine effective advocacy strategies. By becoming a
more integral part of the client community, lawyers will have more
complete and rich information on which to formulate their advocacy
strategies. This approach does not resolve the debate between systemic
advocacy versus individual client advocacy, but it does allow a poverty
lawyer to better assess how a client's or community's goals might best be
achieved.
